October's attack on Israel by Hamas may begin a new period that eclipses the war in Ukraine. But first, let's review what else was happening in the world.
In America, supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia remained the main concern of Biden’s Democrats, while Trump’s Republicans wanted the southern border closed to illegal immigrants.
For India, 2023 was the year it was in charge of the G-20. Arguably its main achievement was to get the African Union admitted to the grouping, alongside the European Union. Modi traveled everywhere except China.
For Russia, the focus was the war against Ukraine, still framed as a war against America, Europe, and NATO. The revolt of the Wagner military unit against the Ministry of Defense produced a few days of drama, but ended anticlimactically. Then, during the significant BRICS meeting in South Africa, word came that the Wagner leadership had all died in a plane crash north of Moscow.
For China, it was a year of post-Covid economic recovery, building towards the tenth-anniversary Belt and Road summit in October. Xi attended the BRICS meeting in South Africa but stayed away from G-20 meetings in India.
In the Middle East, the Palestinian issue was long dormant. The biggest development was perhaps the imminent admission of Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Emirates and Egypt to BRICS in 2024 (along with Ethiopia and Argentina). It will be another big advance of multipolar geopolitics into a region where America is still the hegemon; building upon the restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran, that Russia and China midwifed early in 2023.
Israel itself was still working through its long western-style culture war between religious conservatives who believe that God gave them all the land, and secular liberals more open to sharing it with an Arab state. Its external diplomacy was focused on cultivating the alliance with Gulf Arab states against Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu even had time to travel to America and muse about future artificial intelligence with Elon Musk.
Then came “Al Aqsa Flood”, the devastating October 7 surprise attack by the Palestinians of Gaza, a small enclave between Israel and Egypt run by the Islamic movement Hamas. While a barrage of missiles flew overhead into Israel, Palestinian paramilitary forces broke through the border, grabbed hundreds of hostages for transport back to Gaza, and otherwise killed as many Jews as they could find - over 1400 in the end.
The Hamas leadership called on all Arabs and Muslims to join the struggle until the Jews were defeated, and Israel could become Palestine. But for Israel, the massacre awakened deep fears of genocide, and the country mobilized with the intention of eradicating the Hamas party from Gaza at any cost. Gaza was cut off, heavy bombardment killed thousands of Palestinians, and Israeli tanks and soldiers gathered in preparation for an invasion.
World opinion is largely divided along unipolar and multipolar lines. The countries of the American bloc support Israel’s actions as essential self-defense. Their perception is that Israel can do anything to prevent a second Holocaust. Countries outside the American bloc call for a ceasefire and a “two-state solution”, in which a sovereign Palestine would exist alongside Israel. Their perception is that Palestine is fighting for its freedom from foreign colonizers.
Opinions within the Arab and Muslim worlds have particular significance. After fifty years in which opposition to Israel’s existence was led by Arab nationalists in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Saudi Arabia led the Arab League in agreeing to recognize Israel, if Israel could agree with the Palestinian state on borders, a shared capital, and the return of refugees. Meanwhile, dedication to the complete defeat of Israel was maintained by Islamic groups in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza.
As with the war in Ukraine, the end state of the war in Gaza might be found somewhere among the many peace plans and military scenarios that exist. But we do not yet know which of these will prevail.
